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In this talk, I would like briefly to describe Malay urban centers involved in 
international trade before European intervention brought about drastic changes in 
their polities. I shall attempt to scrutinize to what extent an analysis of their structures 
can be helpful for a better understanding of their social organizations, and try to show 
that their patterns reflect the opposite ideologies that clashed at the turn of the 
seventeenth century and led to a political revolution.
Structures of Trading Cities
I shall limit my analysis to only three port towns of the Malay world, namely 
Malacca on the Western coast of the Malay Peninsula, Banten on the west part of the 
northern Javanese coast, and Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra. This choice is based 
on two plain reasons: because at one moment or another during the period spanning 
from the fifteenth till the seventeenth centuries, these cities were the most important 
trade centers in the Malay archipelago, and because of their extensive commercial 
networks, we have at our disposal rather numerous and detailed sources, produced by 
the Malays themselves or by Chinese or European eyewitnesses, describing these cities;
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also, we are fortunate enough to have, among these documents, some 
contemporaneous maps, even if they may look like mere sketches.
Malacca at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
( Manuel Godinho de Eredia, Declaragao de Malaca)
To begin with, we shall observe the town of Malacca, a prosperous trading city, 
which was founded in the late fourteenth century and reached its peak between the 
last decades of the fifteenth century and 1511, when the Portuguese attacked and 
overwhelmed it. Only one valuable map of the city is available, that drawn by Godinho
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de Eredia, a person of mixed blood, half Portuguese, who lived there in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. This map depicts the situation of the town at the time—that 
is after one century of Portuguese occupation—but with the help of earlier Portuguese 
and, to a much lesser extent, also Malay documents, one can roughly reconstruct the 
structure or at least the main features of the city as they existed before the arrival of the 
Europeans.
Built between the main river and a smaller one, the fortress replaced the sultan's 
compound after the Portuguese conquest. Its size can be estimated from another 
seventeenth-century drawing showing that the wall encompassed a space large 
enough to contain the European city, which proves that the royal compound was not 
only occupied by the palace, but included other buildings and dwellings and actually 
corresponded to the king's city. We know from Malay sources that not long before this 
time, the sultan's compound was still situated upriver at some distance from the port 
city surrounding the harbor. Outside the wall, the rest of the town was divided into 
several separate quarters. Although only two of them bear ethnic names—Chinese and 
Keling kampungs—written sources mention that most of them were inhabited by 
natives of foreign origin, including Javanese, Gujaratis, Tamils, people from Brunei, 
Luzon, and so forth.
6.
Malacca: The walled city at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
(Manuel Faria e Sousa, Asia Portuguesa)
For Aceh, we also have only one rather good map made by the Dutch in the 1640s. 
The town seems to be not separated from the surrounding forest, which has been only 
partially cleared to make room for various kampungs. The agglomeration, oriented 
south-north, lies along the river which, together with a straight street, was used as an 
avenue of communication. The royal compound, surrounded by a moat, consisted of 
the palace itself facing a large open space, with the mosque on its western side, as is
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usual in the old Malay cities, and high officials' residences situated nearby. This royal 
compound was nearly cut off from the kampungs, and by comparing it with other old 
towns such as Pasai, Malacca, and Banten, one can safely guess that when the city was 
founded, it was yet more clearly separated from the working population. Inhabitants 
lived in secluded quarters, scattered from the harbor in the north to the royal 
compound in the south. At least two of the suburbs had an ethnic denomination: 
Chinese and Peguans.
Aceh, c. 1640 (Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana)
For Banten, we have much more abundant material, three maps and two bird's-eye 
views of the city from the seventeenth century, the most accurate, shown here, dating 
from 1659. The river that runs through the city splits into two branches, flowing to the 
sea by two estuaries, used as harbors, and dividing the town into three parts of 
unequal size. The central and main part corresponded to the royal city. By contrast 
with the previous examples, Banten presented the peculiarity of being surrounded by a 
defense wall. In its center was the royal square, on the sides of which were built the 
palace and, close by it, the two principal state-ministers' houses, as well as the mosque 
on the west side. This open space represented the city's heart, physically and also 
symbolically, the center being embodied by a sacred banyan tree, commonly thought
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in Java to be the abode of the town's guardian spirit. Starting from this center, four 
straight streets, oriented on the points of the compass, roughly divided the royal city 
into four parts. As this map was made for intelligence purposes, the Dutch mapmaker 
set out to depict the official compound with great care, leaving the rest of the walled 
city blank. But written testimonies mention that, outside this compound, the town was 
divided into many quarters, each of them repeating, on a small scale, the pattern of the 
town itself, with a square flanked by a lord's mansion and a mosque at the center, the 
whole being surrounded by clusters of houses. Each quarter was under the control of 
this aristocratic lord, appointed by the king, and all the people living there were his 
subjects or his bondsmen. That structure implies that only Bantenese citizens could 
inhabit the walled city.
In the western quarter, called China Town, lived the most important foreign 
merchants of the country, those involved in international trade, be they Chinese, 
Europeans, or whatever. For that reason, the administrative centers for trade or foreign 
affairs, such as the shahbandar's office, the custom's office, the official weight house, the 
Chinese captain's residence, as well as the four European factories, were situated there.
In the eastern quarter lay the great market of the town, surrounded by shops and 
dwellings. This part was devoted to retail commerce and craftsmanship. People living 
in this section were of non-Bantenese origin, coming from remote countries as well as 
from various parts of the Malay archipelago. Venturing further eastward, a visitor to
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the city would encounter a poor suburb inhabited by mariners and fishermen, 
followed by shipyards and saltworks.
Interpretation
In spite of their apparent differences, these cities reflect quite similar perceptions of 
social organization. To throw some light on the question, I think it is best to start with 
the case of Banten. As we have just seen, trade and manufacturing sectors were located 
outside the city wall, in proximity to both harbors, leaving the central and largest part 
of the town devoid of any economic activities. The walled city was exclusively 
inhabited by a population of Bantenese origin, whereas, as a rule, foreigners had to 
dwell in the two external suburbs. This twofold division of the population implies that 
in this port city, trade and additional activities representing the bulk of their resources 
were not directly in the hands of the local population, but were left to foreigners. It 
goes without saying that the court would draw huge profit from these activities 
through various taxes, and that some, if not all, of the grandees often used to 
participate financially in these enterprises, which were otherwise carried out by foreign 
merchants. Indeed, the gentry owned land, villages, or pepper plantations granted by 
the king. But the income procured from these agricultural possessions remained low 
and unchanging, and in no case could it match the huge return earned by trade; this 
distinction grew even more sharp when the basis of the Bantenese economy shifted 
from pepper export to commercial exchange. In other words, for their living, the 
Bantenese population depended almost exclusively upon foreign traders' activities.
If one turns now to the two other cities and compares them with Banten, one 
observes that they obviously present some similar features. One can find the same 
physical division between the royal compound and the dwellings of the population 
involved in harbor activities, who were mainly of foreign origin. Apparently, those 
people were not distributed among the various kampungs on a strict ethnic basis, as 
place names could suggest, but rather were distributed according to their activities, as 
we can infer from accounts of Malacca. The main difference between Banten and 
Malacca and Aceh was that the latter two did not have royal compounds or royal cities 
as large and as populated as that of Banten.
From these observations, one might attempt to draw some conclusions regarding 
social organization. Formerly, as far as we know, old trading cities were actually made 
up of two distinct towns built along the same river; such was clearly the case with 
Pasai, Banten, and Malacca, where royal compounds and harbor settlements were 
located several kilometers apart, each town sometimes bearing a different name. This 
physical split reflected a peculiar perception of society: the harbor population on the 
shore was turned towards the sea and the sea activities, whereas the king faced 
landward, indicating that he wanted to be considered as the necessary intermediary 
between inland and coastal populations. A neat boundary specified the different roles. 
The king had political power over the land and its populations. The harbor population, 
of foreign extraction, had the right to settle in the kingdom and to trade in exchange for 
taxes paid to the king. But as guests of the country, they had no say in political matters. 
In the course of time, either because population growth led to the building of houses 
between the two components, as in Aceh, or because of a king's decision to move his
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palace near the harbor, as in Malacca or Banten, the two previously split towns moved 
progressively closer to each other, to the point where they formed a whole. This is the 
moment depicted by our maps. One would have expected that this new closeness 
would have led to a blending of men and opinions. If this was the case, it did not last 
for long; quickly, instead, arose political turmoil that presents in each case all the 
characteristics of a revolution.
The Social Revolution
In spite of their scarcity, sources on sixteenth-century Aceh enable us to perceive 
the tragic events that struck the country. In the 1520s, Aceh under the leadership of a 
local prince overwhelmed the trading cities of the whole northern tip of Sumatra and 
established itself as the main political and economic power of the region. Some fifty 
years later, the state faced an acute crisis at the time of a king's succession. Within only 
one year, three different sultans succeeded one another on the throne, among them an 
infant aged only some months. This instability resulted from the rivalry between 
members of the kingdom's elite, called orangkayas, whose influence in political affairs 
had increased to the point that they arrogated the right to elect the sultan. In 1579, they 
chose an old man for king, persuaded that he would have neither the vigor nor the 
time to establish strong royal power. It turned out that they were dead wrong. The old 
man survived fifteen more years and displayed an uncommon eagerness to restore 
royal prerogatives. To put an end to the excessive influence of the orangkayas, he 
ordered a massacre that went on for several days. According to one testimony, in a 
single night one thousand of these people perished.
On the crucial question about the orangkayas' identity, opinions differ. Some 
historians have contented themselves with a broad meaning of "elite," while others are 
of the opinion that this term refers to the landed gentry, and yet others that it refers to 
the middle class. For reasons that I cannot detail here for lack of time, I definitely 
support the last opinion. If this interpretation is not wrong, these political events have 
to be interpreted as an attempt by the middle class to seize or to keep political power 
and to restrict kingship to a mere ceremonial and symbolic position that even an infant 
could hold. Aceh had then become a sort of oligarchic republic, with a nominal king at 
the head, and the bloodbath that marked the beginning of the new king's reign 
constituted his first endeavor to restore (or it may be to establish) royal power. He 
could not achieve this goal himself; his task was taken over and completed by his 
grandson, who succeeded, through brutality, in imposing an absolute royal power 
upon the country at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
It is easy to find parallels between these events and the situation in Banten. In 1580, 
under the same circumstances, again involving a royal succession, members of that 
city's elite chose, among the princes entitled to the throne, an infant as king; the other 
pretenders would all have had the capacities actually to rule. They formed a regency 
council which, of course, was weighted totally in their favor. In the absence of a strong 
royal power, this group ruled the country for at least some thirty years. In the case of 
Banten, no doubt remains about the elites' social identity: the new rulers were traders 
and supporters of commercial activities. In short, they belonged to the bourgeois 
middle class. Like Aceh, Banten had been transformed into a sort of oligarchic
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republic. The bourgeois elite succeeded in maintaining control of Bantenese affairs 
until a spirited prince led his military forces against them. The bourgeoisie did not 
have the means to resist in the civil war that followed and had to surrender. The prince 
installed himself as the head of a new regency council and exiled the previous 
government of commoners and its supporters to a neighboring principality in 1609. 
According to a Dutch document, seven thousand people were forced to flee. After that, 
the king assumed absolute power in Banten. That social revolution is reflected by our 
rare maps. Although very sketchy, the earliest plan of Banten, drawn by the Dutch 
during their first voyage to the East Indies at the end of the sixteenth century, i.e. 
before the social revolution, clearly shows the partition of the town into thirds, and its 
caption, which gives the location of the residences of prominent figures in the town, 
indicates that some great foreign traders lived within the walled city, that is, within the 
royal city. In other words, they had invested themselves with political power.
Through these two cases, one can see the drastic changes that occurred in the two 
main trading kingdoms of the Malay world in the last decades of the sixteenth century 
and at the turn of the seventeenth century. In both cases, one witnesses the failure of 
the middle class to structure itself as a political force and to govern permanently. Both 
attempts were rather short-lived, and the middle class had to accept total submission 
to the royal power or physically disappear, either by being murdered, as in Aceh, or 
exiled, as in Banten. The defeat they suffered erased one of the biggest advantages that 
urban society can grant to its members: greater social mobility. At the same time, one 
sees the establishment of an autocratic political system, very similar to those already 
common to the agrarian kingdoms of the region. At this point, an important remark 
must be added: documents inform us that in Banten, the leaders of the party willing to 
restrict royal power were merchants, foreigners, or persons of mixed parentage. 
Among them were the two highest officials of the country, originating from the 
Coromandel coast in India. This point cannot come as a surprise insofar as only an 
active population could generate a middle class, and economic activities were 
essentially restricted to people foreign to the land. We do not have the same detailed 
records at our disposal for Aceh, but the great similarity between the two movements 
lets us guess that the actors in that case must also have been foreign.
The monarchic reaction did not stop here. The kings of Aceh and Banten 
endeavored to establish a monopolistic policy by taking control, for the crown's profit, 
of the sale of pepper, the most valuable commodity produced in their countries. In 
spite of repeated attempts, that state monopoly never produced conclusive results, at 
least economically. While the new order was put into practice in the two kingdoms, the 
arrival of newcomers—the northern Europeans—in the archipelago's waters brought a 
host of troubles to the sovereigns and drove them to extremes. Curiously, the 
documents relating this very important moment are quite scarce. Those explaining the 
reasons behind this radical decision to lay claim to the pepper revenues are even fewer. 
In the first decades of the seventeenth century, in both Aceh and Banten, the kings 
ordered the uprooting of pepper plants in their countries in order to stop or at least 
significantly decrease the production of this spice. The main reason for this act of 
economic suicide was the aggressive behavior of Dutch and English fleets, both toward 
each other and toward the courts, in their endeavors to obtain their loads of pepper. 
Considering themselves unable to control these brutal merchants, who had not 
infrequently made use of their artillery pieces, the kings preferred to eradicate the
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prize that had attracted them. It goes without saying that both countries' economies 
plunged into a deep decay from which Aceh never completely recovered and from 
which Banten did only after decades of painful economic difficulties, after which it was 
decided to plant new pepper trees.
All these events clearly reflect ideological debates concerning, economically, royal 
monopoly versus free enterprise, and, politically, monarchy versus oligarchy. It might 
be of some interest to have a closer look at these debates.
Ideological Crisis
It seems superfluous to dwell on the merchants' ideology, clearly based on 
individual merit and political control. I would rather try to determine the Malay social 
ideology that seems more difficult to understand.
An analysis of the cities might help us. From the perspective of outsiders, at least, 
the most striking feature of Banten and Aceh was their unusual appearance. Houses, 
built of vegetable materials, disappeared from view, hidden by fruit trees and shrubs. 
Foreign sources, European as well as Chinese, relate the puzzlement of travelers facing 
these densely populated conglomerations in which they recognize not cities, but 
merely huge villages. Streets hardly existed. The rare ones led to the royal compounds 
and had a more ritualistic than practical function. Even these were not paved, not even 
with stones, but were mere paths, indeed rather convenient for barefooted walkers, but 
also dusty or muddy depending on the season.
Stone generally was scarce—not to say inexistent—in buildings and monuments. 
As a result, at these sites practically no permanent structures remained from earlier 
times, except for an enigmatic building in the shape of a small circular tower, called 
gunungan, in Aceh, and in Banten a stone minaret erected in front of the mosque. Of 
course time, wars, and other events caused destruction, but contemporaneous sources 
do not provide any clue that more permanent structures existed in larger number in 
the past. Official buildings, such as palaces and shrines, were essentially wood 
constructions, as were all the private houses of the town. The sovereigns never thought 
of erecting monuments which, by their originality, their size, or their richness, would 
have embellished the city and maintained their names through the ages. Tombstones 
were the only structures that embodied the concept of monuments. That this situation 
resulted from a deliberate choice can be inferred from the fact that Malay people 
proved time and again their great mastery of stone construction in religious buildings. 
Moreover, in Banten, one only had to glance at the Chinese quarter across the river to 
see a wholly different idea of a town, with its rows of stone houses built on both sides 
of straight streets.
This attachment to a natural environment, even to the earth, can again be found in 
other aspects of these histories. We have just alluded to the tragic moment when both 
kings of Aceh and Banten ordered the uprooting of pepper trees in their territories. 
Simultaneously, they made the decision to turn traders who had lost their livelihood 
into peasants. One might argue that this attitude could, of course, be explained by their 
will to make their kingdoms self-sufficient. However, behind this decision, which 
might be interpreted as an act of good governance, there also lies in hiding a mistrust
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in trade and an eagerness to keep in contact with earth and land. In the royal chronicle 
of another pepper-producing country, Banjarmasin, in Borneo, the court author recalls 
the wise words of a former king who opposed the danger of pepper growing while 
extolling the benefits of rice cultivation. A more telling example can be found in the 
policy of Sultan Ageng of Banten. In the first years of his reign, he enforced a 
monopolistic policy in pepper trade, but when confronted by its failure, he followed 
his Chinese councilors' advice and shifted to a more liberal one. That shift gave Banten 
the chance to become the greatest native commercial kingdom in the seventeenth 
century. Sultan Ageng was also the first Malay king who showed the will to possess 
his own merchant fleet, a decision that enabled him to make a profit not only, as usual, 
from cash crops production, but also from the transportation of those commodities to 
consumers' markets, and, finally, from trade in other goods, the latter activities being 
much more lucrative. At first glance, the king appears to have been truly merchant- 
minded. Reality seems to have been quite different, however. In these affairs, his role 
was limited to supporting a commercial venture conceived by European and Chinese 
merchants. He should only have credit for taking a financial share in this attempt, with 
the hope, of course, of gaining a return on his investment. When the actual actors 
disappeared, the king sold his ships and the venture came to a standstill.
If, as far as we know, this king never involved himself in trade, except by investing 
capital, he showed a passionate eagerness for agricultural development. Unceasingly, 
he launched new projects, digging canals, erecting dams, clearing forests, opening new 
lands, building new villages to which urban populations were relocated by the 
thousands. He even decided to transfer his court to one of the new villages where he 
settled, far from the busy city, devoting himself to agricultural projects so intensely 
that his behavior incurred not a few sarcastic comments from the traders. In my 
opinion, the tight link between society and land constitutes one of the main 
components of the Malay monarchic outlook.
Although after the revolution trade and contacts abroad were still carried out from 
all the Malay cities, merchants were put aside, left on the periphery of the state, and 
accepted only so long as they themselves accepted the new political order. In a sense, 
they were excluded from the "real" society, but at the same time they enjoyed 
enormous privileges, since the country depended on them for the bulk of its budget. 
This ambiguous status was apparently more easily accepted by Chinese merchants 
than by Indians, as the case of Banten shows. The former took the latter's place after 
the revolution. They acted as agents of the king and the gentry and never claimed more 
political power or demanded better social integration. They enjoyed a sort of 
monopoly in all the nonagricultural activities, having no native competitors to fear, 
and in spite of their limited citizenship, their condition could arouse envy among 
potential emigrants, mostly Chinese, who in the following years kept on coming in an 
uninterrupted flood.
One sees that, on the negative side, the advantages of the urban life did not find 
their way into these big cities. These societies had little more to offer than villages 
would for the improvement of individuals' lives and progress. Education was limited 
to the learning of prayers, and religious commentaries were, for the most part, mere 
repetitions of existing passages in books. Institutions intended to improve people's 
welfare were curiously lacking: there were no Malay hospitals, orphanages, or old
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people's homes, though such institutions existed in Sri Lanka or China, for example, 
and though emigrants from those countries were living in the Malay cities. Obviously, 
the agrarian perception of each city by its rulers and the ethnic division of the society 
greatly contributed to curb a progressive evolution.
After this quick review of social organization, it would be of some interest to have a 
look at economic policy. These trading cities were relatively small states, but 
contemporary travelers' accounts describe them as well-off, and several of these 
accounts give rather precise details about kings' treasures that could be weighed in 
tons of gold, not to mention silver specie kept in quantities large enough to enable the 
state to act as a bank and loan huge amounts of money to traders. This raises the 
question of how this wealth was spent. As we have just seen, welfare institutions did 
not exist, nor did prestigious buildings, nor monuments. A labor force for public works 
and soldiers for wars were provided by the grandees from the local population they 
governed, which means labor costs were unlikely to have severely burdened the royal 
budget. Firearms had to be imported, but by reading the documents carefully, one 
notices that if indeed some cannons were purchased, many others were donated and 
others simply seized.
The greatest source of expenses could have been the decorum and pomp that 
surrounded the king's person and the gentry in official ceremonies and festivals. Even 
so, it is doubtful that golden clothes, jewels, horse or elephant caparisons, gilded boats, 
and other luxury goods could drain the fortunes of these flourishing trading cities. If 
we do not misinterpret the sources, we have to come to the conclusion that these riches 
were distributed, in rather small amounts but regularly, so that they left behind no 
trace in historical sources nor remains in archaeological sites. If this conclusion is true, 
it would fit rather well in the general framework of the society as we have pictured it, 
and it answers the enigma concerning the local population's source of revenues. One 
does not know where precisely the incomes of the Bantenese come from. When 
describing the Javanese town, European travelers spoke sarcastically about the laziness 
of its inhabitants. It is not the place here to enter into the debate on this topos of the 
western perception of the tropics; suffice it to point out that this term, "lazy," is not 
applied to the foreign quarters, and therefore that it described a way of life that seemed 
peculiar and difficult to understand for Westerners. For Banten, we have seen that the 
grandees drew their revenues from villages, pepper gardens, or salt panning. But it is 
very doubtful that these incomes covered their own expenses and those of their 
numerous bondsmen. Most of the accounts describe the gentry as not very wealthy, 
but they do not depict the Javanese population as poor in the same way they do the 
laborers living outside the royal city. That leads us to conclude that the king, or the 
state, provided the grandees with money in one way or another, thus helping to 
support their elite subjects in a way that mirrored the relationship between grandees 
and their dependent bondsmen and servants. All this means that a strict hierarchy 
could survive through this benevolent distribution of wealth and that, in fine, the king 




It has often been pointed out that Islam, born in a western context, was the bearer 
of concepts and ideas from that region, including such concepts as individuality, the 
preeminence of man over any creature, and oriented time. All these notions were in 
large part opposed to mentalities elaborated or acclimatized in the Malay world before 
the introduction of Islam to the region. In the cities under discussion, at the time that 
concerns us, the Islamic religion was already deeply rooted in the society. It is 
therefore worthwhile to scrutinize the extent and the direction of the evolution of 
mentalities under Muslim influence. Literature can provide helpful material here.
At first sight, all the literature produced in these three cities can be stamped as 
Islamic, since works seem to compete with each other in asserting their compliance to 
that religion. A closer look, however, enables us to distinguish two main trends.
The first trend includes works that attempt to integrate the Malay world into the 
large whole made up of Muslim nations, and that consequently try to give their own 
world the same references. One can find Malay translations or adaptations of books 
written in the Near East, genealogies connecting the Malay kings to heroes—famous 
for their religious or mundane deeds—from the Near East, as well as works depicting 
characters venturing on long and hazardous journeys in order to describe the greatness 
of the civilized world, narratives that match those originating from the Islamic 
countries. That literature, praising individual virtues, bravery, wisdom, or shrewdness 
and presenting to readers, or listeners, a world defined by its ideology and not by 
ethnic boundaries, is likely to have appeared in the fifteenth century and died out 
almost definitely in the mid-seventeenth century.
The second trend, essentially originating from the princely courts, had for its 
purpose to glorify the royal lineages, but was set within narrow spaces limited by 
"national" or, at best, Malay frontiers. This group of texts is of course made up of all 
the royal chronicles that occur in all our cities. It is striking to observe that in these 
works, the foreign countries with which these towns had continuous business 
relationships, or even the heterogeneous communities in these towns to whom they 
owed their prosperity, are not mentioned. This sort of literature, reflecting the royal 
ideology, might have existed at the same time as the former trend, but it becomes truly 
prominent in the Malay world during the seventeenth century.
In my opinion, this brief, too brief, description is likely to show that for a rather 
short period after its introduction, Islam succeeded in changing mentalities by 
integrating the Malay cities into a Muslim world, stretched from the Mediterranean to 
the shores of the Pacific Ocean, with its bases anchored in the West. Later on, Islam has 
progressively been adapted to local cultures through preferences given to ritual 
observance and a mysticism tending to abolish the distance between God and his 
creatures and thus to reduce its teaching to a monistic interpretation, easily suitable to 
the believers of other religions.
Other examples, besides literature, show the same process of reappraisal of local 
values and culture. Concerning Pasai, the principal kingdom of north Sumatra prior to 
Aceh, the chronicle of Malacca states that in its earlier period, Arabic and Persian 
languages were in use there, a situation confirmed by the Moroccan traveler Ibn
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Battuta, who, during his visit to this city in the fourteenth century, seems not to have 
met with any linguistic difficulties in the social circles he frequented.
The statement of the Malaccan chronicle also implies that circumstances had 
already changed by the time it was written, and that in the fifteenth century these 
foreign languages were less or no longer understood among the elite, an obvious fact 
for the mystic poet Hamzah Fansuri, who chose to write in Malay, says he, in order to 
be understood by those ignorant of Arabic or Persian. And again the Malaccan 
chronicle remarks that a nobleman of that town was considered to be a learned man for 
the reason that he knew something of Arabic language and grammar.
In Aceh, by contrast with the other sultanates, there was a common habit of 
erecting tombstones with engraved inscriptions made up of pious formulas and the 
name and life dates of the deceased. All these inscriptions were written in Arabic until 
the sixteenth century. In the seventeenth century, a new trend arose with the engraving 
of pseudo inscriptions which retain from the original language only a symbolic image, 
of course unreadable and meaningless. Still in Aceh, whereas all the works used to be 
written in Malay, a language spoken over a wide area, for the first time in the 
seventeenth century a book written in the local idiom, Acehnese, appeared; from that 
moment it became the principal literary language. Therefore, the northern tip of 
Sumatra passed progressively from an international language, Arabic or Persian, to a 
regional one before at last adopting a local idiom.
One cannot but be struck by the synchrony between the social evolution, as each of 
these cities changed from a sort of—what I called—oligarchic republic to an autocratic 
monarchy, and the evolution of Islam from an alien belief, revolutionary in its new 
concepts, into a tamed religion, suited to local mentalities, and the transition in this 
region from an international language to a vernacular one. In all the cases, one can 
observe that references to a wide geographical area decrease and vanish to give place 
to a reassertion of the local values of old.
As we have seen earlier, the economic and political system that was established or 
restored in the trading cities during the seventeenth century was borrowed from the 
agrarian polities of the region, particularly although not exclusively, from Java. In 
order to implement this model in an urban and trading context, it had been necessary 
to come to use occupational and ethnic criteria. Dividing the population in this way 
made it difficult for there to be any mobility within the local society; the middle class 
was truncated, and foreign traders were prevented from playing a political role.
The trading sultanates were at this stage of their social evolution when the 
Europeans imposed their grip on the area. It is hard to guess how they would have 
changed had they preserved their freedom. It is obvious, however, that by relying for a 
long time on the support of local gentries, colonization has had lasting effects by 
freezing social structures which, as we have just seen, contained the seeds of a 
completely different evolution.
